A RECENT APPROACH TO CONTINUOUS TIME OPEN LOOP STACKELBERG DYNAMIC GAME WITH MIN-MAX COOPERATIVE AND NONCOOPERATIVE FOLLOWERS by Osman, M.S. et al.
European Scientific Journal January 2015 edition vol.11, No.3 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
94 
A RECENT APPROACH TO CONTINUOUS TIME 
OPEN LOOP STACKELBERG DYNAMIC GAME 






10th Of Ramadan University, Egypt 
N.A. El-Kholy, Dr. 
Tanta University, Faculty Of Science, Egypt 
E.I.Soliman, PhD Student 




 Stackelberg games play an extremely important role in such fields as 
economics, management, politics and behavioral sciences. There exists 
extensive literature about static optimization problems. However, the studies 
on dynamic optimization problems are relatively scarce in spite of the 
importance in explaining and predicting some phenomena rationally. In this 
paper, new approach of continuous time open loop stackelberg differential 
game introduced with a min-max game (secure concept) between multiple 
followers playing dependently (the pareto followers) and others 
independently (the nash followers), the problem formulation is presented 
with an example for the solution of the game.  
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Introduction    
        Stackelberg (leader–follower) games have a wide variety of 
applications. In a stackelberg game, one player acts as a leader and the rest as 
followers. The problem is then to find an optimal strategy for the leader, 
assuming that the Followers react in such a rational way that they optimize 
their objective functions given the leader’s actions. This is the static 
optimization model introduced by von stackelberg (Von Stackelberg, 1952). 
When players interact by playing a similar stage game numerous times, the 
game is called a dynamic, or repeated game. Unlike static games, players 
have at least some information about the strategies chosen on others and thus 
may contingent their play on past moves. Dynamic optimization was first 
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considered by (Chen, Cruz, 1972) and (Simaan, Cruz, 1973a ), and 
subsequently studied by a number of authors (Basar, Olsder, 1995), (Li, 
Cruz, Simaan, 2002), (Nie, Chen, Fukushima, 2006), (Nie, 2005), (Fent, 
Feichtinger, Tragler, 2002) and (Feichtinger, Grienauer, Tragler, 2002). In 
(Chen and Cruz, 1972) and (Simaan, Cruz, 1973a), necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the stackelberg games with open-loop information have been 
obtained and explicit solutions are given. In (Simaan, Cruz, 1973b), 
stackelberg solution is extended to multi-players and necessary conditions 
for the existence of an open-loop stackelberg games are shown. In this paper 




         Consider open - loop stakelberg differential game with M N+  
followers. Under the concept of coalition we suppose that the M  of these 
players agree to form a coalition and cooperate as a single player to 
minimize their collective costs playing a min - max differential game against 
the others N  nash followers outside the coalition.let 
 ( ) lu t R∈  be the composite control of the players inside the coalition, 
( ) mv t R∈  be the composite control of the players outside the coalition, and 
( )s l m
ou R
− +∈  be the strategy of the leader where the composite control 
( , , ) sou u v R∈  is an element of the constrain set 
0 0= {( , , ) | ( ) = ( , ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )), ( ) = , ( , , , , ) 0}
s
o o ou u v R x t f t x t u t u t v t x t x h t x u u vΩ ∈ ≥
, where 
( ) = ( , ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ))ox t f t x t u t u t v t  
           Represent the system of nonlinear differential equations that govern 
the game motion, and 
0 0 0
0
( , , , , ) = ( ( )) ( , ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ))
t f
o f ot
J t x u u v x t I t x t u t u t v tφ + ∫
0
( , , , , ) = ( ( )) ( , ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )) , = 1,2, ,
t f
i o i f i ot
J t x u u v x t I t x t u t u t v t i Mφ + ∫     
0
( , , , , ) = ( ( )) ( , ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )) , = 1,2, ,
t f
j o j f j ot
J t x u u v x t I t x t u t u t v t j Nφ + ∫   
 are the cost functions for the leader and the M N+  followers respectively, 
where 0[ , ]ft t  denotes the fixed prescribed duration of the game,  
( ) nx t R∈  is the state vector of the game,  
0(.) :[ , ]
n s q
fh t t R R R× × →   
0(.) :[ , ]
n s n
ff t t R R R× × →  
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0(.) :[ , ]
n s
j fI t t R R R× × → , = 1,2, , .j N  
0(.) :[ , ]
n s
i fI t t R R R× × → , = 1,2, , .i M  
(.) : nj R Rφ → , = 1,2, , .j N  
(.) : ni R Rφ → , = 1,2, , .i M  
Are continuous differentiable functions.  
        Definition 1.1 the pareto response set P  for the M  followers, is the set 
of all ( , , ) sou u v R∈Ω⊆  such that for each = 1,2, , .i M  there does not 
exist ( , , )ou u v ∈Ω  such that   
    ( , , ) = ( , , )i o i oJ u u v J u u v  
And for at least one i 
( , , ) ( , , )i o i oJ u u v J u u v  
         Definition 1.2 the nash response set D  for the N  followers, is the set 
of all ( , , ) sou u v R∈Ω⊆  such that for each = 1,2, ,j N   
 ( , , ) ( , , , )jj o j o jJ u u v J u u v v−≤   
 for all ( , ) mjjv v R− ∈  such that ( , , , )jo ju u v v− ∈Ω  where 
1 2 1 1= ( , , , , , , )j j j Nv v v v v v− − +         
          Definition 1.3 a control *( , , ) sou u v R∈Ω⊆  is a min-max solution for 
the player i  of the m followers if and only if *( , , )ou u v P∈  and  
* *( , , ) ( , , )i o i oJ u u v J u u v≤  
 for all *( , , )ou u v ∈Ω   
            Definition 1.4 a control *( , , )j sou u v R∈Ω⊆  is a min-max solution 
for the player j  of the n followers if and only if *( , , )jou u v D∈  and  
* *( , , ) ( , , )jj o j oJ u u v J u u v≤  
 for all *( , , )ou u v ∈Ω   
             Definition 1.5 a control * * *( , , ) sou u v R∈Ω⊆  is a stackelberg 
solution for the leader of the defined game if and only if * * *( , , )ou u v D P∈ ∩  
and  
* * *( , , ) ( , , )o o o oJ u u v J u u v≤     for all ( , , )ou u v D P∈ ∩ . 
 the problem is formally stated as follows:  
1. Find * *( , , )ou u v  and 
* *( , , )ou u v  that solves the problems: 
 * * * *1
=1
: ( , , , ) = ( , , , )min
M
o i i o
u i
P J t u u v w J t u u v∑  
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           * *
0
= ( ( )) ( , , , , )
t f
f ot
x t I t x u u v dtφ + ∫  
 subject to  
 * * * * * *0 0= {( , , ) | ( ) = ( , , , , ), ( ) = , ( , , , , ) 0}
s




: ( , , , ) = ( , , , )maxmin
M
o i i o
u v i
P J t u u v w J t u u v∑  
     *
0
= ( ( )) ( , , , , )
t f
f ot
x t I t x u u v dtφ + ∫  
 subject to  
 * * *0 0= {( , , ) | ( ) = ( , , , , ), ( ) = , ( , , , , ) 0}
s
o o ou u v R x t f t x u u v x t x h t x u u vΩ ∈ ≥  
 respectively, where 
0
( ( ), ( ), ( )) = ( ( )) [ , ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )] , = 1,2, ,
t f
i o i f i ot
J u t u t v t x t I t x t u t u t v t dt i Mφ + ∫ 
 are the cost functions for the M  players, 
=1
( ( )) = ( ( ))
M
f i i f
i
x t w x tφ φ∑  and 
* * * *
=1
( , , , , ) = ( , , , , )
M
o i i o
i
I t x u u v w I t x u u v∑  for each w W∈ , where 
=1





W w R w w∈ ≥ ∑ ,  
 2. Find * *( , , )ou u v  and 
* *( , , )jou u v  that solves the problems:  
* * * *
3
0
ˆ ˆ: ( , , , , ) = ( ( )) ( , , , , , )min
t f
j o j j j f j o j jtv j
P J t u u v v x t I t x u u v v dtφ− −+ ∫  
 subject to
* * * * * *
0 0ˆ ˆ ˆ= {( , , , ) | ( ) = ( , , , , , ), ( ) = , ( , , , , , ) 0}
s
o j j o j j o j ju u v v R x t f t x u u v v x t x h t x u u v v− − −Ω ∈ ≥
 
  * * * *4
0
: ( , , , , ) = ( ( )) ( , , , , , )maxmin
t f
j o j j j f j o j jtv uj
P J t u u v v x t I t x u u v v dtφ− −+ ∫  
 subject to 
* * * * * *
0 0= {( , , , ) | ( ) = ( , , , , , ), ( ) = , ( , , , , , ) 0}
s
o j j o j j o j ju u v v R x t f t x u u v v x t x h t x u u v v− − −Ω ∈ ≥
 respectively,  
 3. Find * * *( , , )ou u v  that solves the problems 1P , 3P  and 
* * * *
5 0 0 0
0
: ( , , , , ) = ( ( )) ( , ( ), ( ), ( ) , ( ) )min
t f
o f otuo
P J t x u u v x t I t x t u t u t v tφ + ∫  
 subject to  
 * * * * * *0 0= {( , , ) | ( ) = ( , , , , ), ( ) = , ( , , , , ) 0}
s
o o ou u v R x t f t x u u v x t x h t x u u vΩ ∈ ≥  
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 where, 0( ) :[ , ]
n
fx t t t R→  the state of the system is assumed to be a 
piecewise continuous function of t , and the functions  
0:[ , ]
n s n
ff t t R R R× × → , 0φ , jφ ,  




 if *( , , ) sou u v R∈Ω⊆  is pareto solution for the m followers inside the 
coalition with state trajectory *x  corresponding to problem 1P , then there 
exist continuous costate functions 0:[ , ]
n
fp t t R→ , 
qRδ ∈  such that the 
following relations are satisfied  
 * * * * 0 0( ) = ( , , , , ) , ( ) =ox t f t x u u v x t x   
 
* *
1( , , , , , , , , , )( ) =
( )















f i i f
if
x t





∂ ∑   
 
* *




   
 * *( , , , , ) = 0oh t x u u vδ   
 * *( , , , , ) 0oh t x u u v ≥   
 0δ ≥   
 where  
1
=1
( , , , , , , , , , ) = ( , , , , ) ( , , , )
M
T
o M i i o
i
H t x u u v w w p w I t x u u v p f t x u vδ +∑  
                  ( , , , , )T oh t x u u vδ−   
 is the hamiltonian function of the followers inside the coalition and its 
partial derivatives. 
Furthermore, if * *( , , ) sou u v R∈Ω⊆  is min-max point for the pareto 
followers with state trajectory *x  corresponding to problems 2P , then there 
exist continuous costate functions 0:[ , ]
n
fp t t R→ , 
qRς ∈  and j qRη ∈  such 
that the following relations are satisfied  
 * * * * * 0 0( ) = ( , , , , ), ( ) =ox t f t x u u v x t x   
 
* * *
1( , , , , , , , , , , )( ) =
( )
j





   











f i i f
if
x t





∂ ∑   
 
* * *
1( , , , , , , , , , , ) = 0
j




   
 
* * *









   
 * * *( , , , , ) = 0oh t x u u vς   
 * * *( , , , , ) = 0, = 1,2, , .j oh t x u u v j Nη    
 * * *( , , , , ) 0oh t x u u v ≥   
 0ς ≥   




( , , , , , , , , , , ) = ( , , , , ) ( , , , , )
M
T
o M i i o o
i
H t x u u v w w p w I t x u u v p f t x u u vς η +∑  
             ( , , , , )T oh t x u u vς−   
 is the hamiltonian function of the followers inside the coalition and its 
partial derivatives evaluated using the two sets of multipliers ς  and jη . 
Now for the followers outside the coalition, if *( , , ) sou u v R∈Ω⊆  is nash 
equilibrium point for the N  players corresponding to problem 3P , then there 
exist continuous costate functions 0:[ , ]
j n
fq t t R→ , 
j qRδ ∈ such that the 
following relations are satisfied 
 * * * * 0 0( ) = ( , , , , ), ( ) =ox t f t x u u v x t x   
 














   
 
*( ( ))










    
 
* *( , , , , , , )










   
 * *( , , , , ) = 0, = 1,2, ,j oh t x u u v j Nδ     
 * *( , , , , ) 0oh t x u u v ≥   
 0, = 1,2, ,j j Nδ ≥    
 where  
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 ( , , , , , , ) = ( , , , , ) ( , , , , )j j jTj o j o oH t x u u v q I t x u u v q f t x u u vδ +  
             ( , , , , ), = 1,2, , .jT oh t x u u v j Nδ−    
 are the hamiltonian functions of each follower and its partial derivatives. 
Furthermore, if * *( , , )j sou u v R∈Ω⊆  is a min-max point for player j  
of the nash players corresponding to problem 4P , then there exist continuous 
costate functions 0:[ , ]
j n
fq t t R→ , 
j qRς ∈  and j qRη ∈  such that the 
following relations are satisfied  
 * * * * * 0 0( ) = ( , , , , ), ( ) =
j
ox t f t x u u v x t x   
 
* * *( , , , , , , , )
( ) =
( )










   
 
*( ( ))














( , , , , , , , ) ˆ= 0, = 1,2, , , = 1,2, ,
j j j j
oj
j
H t x u u v q




    
 
* * *( , , , , , , , )
= 0, = 1,2, ,
j j j j




   
ˆ * * * ˆ( , , , , ) = 0, = 1,2, , , = 1,2, ,j joh t x u u v j N j Nς     
 * * *( , , , , ) = 0, = 1,2, ,j joh t x u u v j Nη    
 * * *( , , , , ) 0joh t x u u v ≥   
 0, = 1,2, ,j j Nς ≥    
 0, = 1,2, , .j j Nη ≤    
 where  
( , , , , , , , ) = ( , , , , ) ( , , , , )j j j jTj o j o oH t x u u v q I t x u u v q f t x u u vς η +  
          ( , , , , ), = 1,2, , .jT oh t x u u v j Nς−    
 are the hamiltonian functions of the nash players and its partial derivatives 
evaluated using the two sets of multipliers jς  and jη .  
Theorem 2 
 if * *( , , ) sou u v R∈Ω⊆  and * *( , , )j sou u v R∈Ω⊆  are the min-max points 
corresponding to problems 2P  and 4P  respectively, then * * *( , , ) sou u v R∈Ω⊆  
is an interior open loop stackelberg solution for the leader with pareto and 
nash followers, and *x  the corresponding state trajectory, if there exist 
continuous costate functions 0:[ , ]
n
fp t t R→  and 0:[ , ]
j n
fq t t R→  such that 
 * * * * * * 0 0( ) = ( , , , , ), ( ) =ox t f t x u u v x t x   
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* * * *
1
ˆ( , , , , , , , , , )( ) =
( )















f i i f
if
x t





∂ ∑   
 
* * * *
1




   
* * * * ˆ( , , , , , , )






H t x u u v q





     
 
*( ( ))










    
 
* * * * ˆ( , , , , , , )









   
 * * * *( , , , , ) 0oh t x u u v ≥   
 * * * *ˆ ( , , , , ) = 0oh t x u u vδ   
 * * * *ˆ ( , , , , ) = 0, = 1,2, , .j oh t x u u v j Nδ    
 ˆ 0δ ≥   
 ˆ 0, = 1,2, , .j j Nδ ≥    
 where  
1
=1
ˆ( , , , , , , , , , ) = ( , , , , ) ( , , , , )
M
T
o M j j o o
j
H t x u u v w w p w I t x u u v p f t x u u vδ +∑
             ˆ ( , , , , )oh t x u u vδ−   
 and  
ˆ( , , , , , , ) = ( , , , , ) ( , , , , )j j jTj o j o oH t x u u v q I t x u u v q f t x u u vδ +  
            ˆ ( , , , , ), = 1,2, , .j oh t x u u v j Nδ−    
 are the hamiltonian functions of the followers inside and outside the 
coalition respectively. 
Furthermore, for the leader, there exists continuously differentiable 
functions (costate vectors), 0 0( ) :[ , ]
n
fp t t t R→ , 0( ) :[ , ]
n
ft t t Rρ → , 
0( ) :[ , ]
n
j ft t t Rσ →  and continuous functions 0( ) :[ , ]
l
ft t t Rλ → , 
0 =1
( ) :[ , ] , =
m Nj
j f jj
t t t R m mλ → ∑ ( lagrange multipliers), such that the 
following are satisfied  
 * * * * * * 0 0( ) = ( , , , , ) , ( ) =ox t f t x u u v x t x   
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* * * *
0 0
0
( , , , , , , , , , , , )
( ) =
j
o j jH t x u u v p p qp t
x
ρ λ λ σ∂
−
∂
   
 
* * * *
0 0( , , , , , , , , , , , )( ) =
j
o j jH t x u u v p p qt
p





   
 
* * * *




H t x u u v p p q
t
q





   
 
* * * *
0 0( , , , , , , , , , , , , ) = 0o j j j
H t x u u v p p p q
u




* * * *




H t x u u v p p p q
v




* * * *




H t x u u v p p q
u
ρ λ λ σ∂
∂
  
 * * * *( , , , , ) 0oh t x u u v ≥   
 * * * *( , , , , ) = 0oh t x u u vµ   
 0µ ≥  
With the boundry condtions 
0
0
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))
( ) = , ( ) = , ( ) =
( ) ( ) ( )
f j f fj
f f f
f f f
x t x t x t
p t q t p t
x t x t x t
φ φ φ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂
  
 0 0( ) = 0, ( ) = 0t tρ σ   
 where the hamiltonian function of the leader is given by 
0 0 0 0( , , , , , ) = ( , , , , ) ( , , , , ) [ ] [ ]
T T T
o o o x uH t p x u u v I t x u u v p f t x u u v H Hρ λ+ + −∇ + ∇
     { }
=1
[ ] [ ] ( , , , , )
N
T T T
j x j j v j oj
j
H H h t x u u vσ λ µ+ −∇ + ∇ −∑   
Example 2.1 consider the following stakelberg open loop differential game; 
where the leader announce his control ou R∈ ; then four followers announce 
their controls 4( , )u v R∈  such that two of the followers with control
2
1 2= ( , )u u u R∈  decide to cooperate to minimize their collective cost playing 
a min-max game with each of the last two players outside the coalition with 
controls 21 2= ( , )v v v R∈  that acting independently to each other, the cost 
functions are respectively given by :  
 2 1 2 1 2
0
= [( 1) ]
t f
o ot
J u u u v v dt− + − − +∫  
 2 2 21 1 2 2
0
= [( 3) ( 1) ( 3) ]
t f
ot
J u u u v dt+ − + − + −∫  
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 2 2 22 1 2 1
0




J u u u v dt− + − − + −∫  
 21 1 1 1 1 1
0




J x t v u v u dt+ − + +∫  
and  
 22 2 2 2 2
0




J x t v u u dt+ − + −∫  
S.t.  
5
1 1 2 2
1= ( , , ) | = , = , 0, = 1,2.,
2o o i
u u v R x v x u v u iΩ ∈ + ≥

   
        1 2 1 2
24, 0 1 0
3
u u v and v + ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ 

  
According to the cooperative between the first two followers, the 
hamiltonian function of their collective cost of 1J  and 2J  is given by (8)  
0 0 0( , , , , , , , ) = ( , , , , ) ( , , , , )
T TH t x u u v w p I p f t x u u v h t x u u vδ δ+ −  
 2 2 21 0 2 2= [( 3) ( 1) ( 3) ]w u u u v+ − + − + −  
 2 2 21 2 0 1 1 1
1 1(1 )[( 1) ( 1) ( 2) ] ( )
2 2
w u u u v p v+ − − + − − + − +  
 2 0 2 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 1 2( ) (4 )p u v u u u u uδ δ δ δ+ + − − − − − −  
 4 1 5 2 6 1 7 2
2(1 ) ( )
3
v v v vδ δ δ δ− − − − − −   
 where 1 =w w  and 2 = 1w w− , 0 1w≤ ≤ . 
Applying necessary conditions for pareto solutions equations (1)-(7)we get  
 1
1














































 1 0 1 3
1
= 2 2 4 2 = 0H u wu w
u
δ δ∂ + − − − +
∂
 
 2 0 2 3
2
= (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) = 0H w u w u w
u
δ δ∂ + − − − + − +
∂
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 *( , , , , ) = 0, = 0,2, ,7i i oh t x u u v iδ   
 0, = 0,2, ,7i iδ ≥                                       (67) 
 where 0 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
2= [ , , , 4 , , ,1 , ]
3
h u u u u u v v v v− − − − . Solving the system of 
equations (67), it yields that 1 = 0p , 2 = 0p  and the pareto response set p 
corresponding to = 0iδ  is given by 
   
2
1 20 0 0 0 2
1 2(1 )= ( , , ) | = ( , ) = (2 ) 1, 1 0, ,
1 1 2
w wP u u v u u u w u u u
w w w
  − −  ∈Ω − + + ∈   + − −   
 0
6 1 1 2 ) 6 10, 0, , , 1 2
5 5
ww or u w
w
   − + −  ∈ ∈ ∈ − +         
 (68) 
 for the followers outside the coalition that act independently, (27) gives their 
hamiltonian functions as follows:  
1 1 1
1 0 1( , , , , , , ) = ( , , , , )
j T T
oH t x u u v q I q f h t x u u vδ δ+ −  
    2 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 2
1 1= ( ) ( )
2 2
v u v u q v q u v− + + + + +  
     1 1 1 1 1 10 0 1 1 2 2 3 1 2 4 1 5 2(4 )u u u u u v vδ δ δ δ δ δ− − − − − − − −  
     1 16 1 7 2
2(1 ) ( )
3
v vδ δ− − − −  
2 2 2
2 0 2( , , , , , , ) = ( , , , , )
j T T
oH t x u u v q I q f h t x u u vδ δ+ −  
    2 2 22 2 2 1 1 2 0 2
1= ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
2
v u u q v q u v− + − + + +  
     2 2 2 2 2 20 0 1 1 2 2 3 1 2 4 1 5 2(4 )u u u u u v vδ δ δ δ δ δ− − − − − − − −  
     2 26 1 7 2
2(1 ) ( )
3
v vδ δ− − − −   
 and by applying the necessary conditions (20)-(26),  
 1 11
1






















































































































− + − +
∂
  
 2 2 22 2 2 2 5 7
2
= 2( ) = 0H v u q
v
δ δ∂ − + − +
∂
  
 *( , , , , ) = 1,2., = 0,1, ,7.ji i oh t x u u v j iδ    
 0 = 1,2., = 0,1, ,7.ji j iδ ≥               (70) 
 solving the system of equations(70), it follows that 11 ( ) = 1q t , 
1
2 ( ) = 0q t , 
2





q t  and the nash response set D  is the set of all solutions 
















































                  (72) 
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 now for the min-max solutions for the cooperative players against each 
player outside the coalition can be obtained by applying the necessary 
conditions (9)-(18) 
 *1 0 1 3
1
= 2 2 4 2 = 0H u wu w
u
ς ς∂ + − − − +
∂
 
 *2 0 2 3
2
= (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) = 0H w u w u w
u
ς ς∂ + − − − + − +
∂
 
 1 111 4 6
1




η η∂ − − + − +
∂
 
 2 22 2 5 7
2
= 2 ( 3) = 0H w v p
v
η η∂ − + − +
∂
 
 * *( , , , , ) = 0, = 0,1, ,7.i i oh t x u u v iς   
 * *( , , , , ) = 0, = 1,2., = 0,1, ,7.ji i oh t x u u v j iη   
 0, = 0,1, ,7.i iς ≥   
 0, = 1,2., = 0,1, ,7.ji j iη ≤             (73) 
 solving the system of equations (73), it yields that the pareto min-max 
solutions are *0( , , )u u v ∈Ω  where 
*u P∈  given by (68) and = (0,0)v  for 
(0,1)w∈ . Furthermore, the hamiltonian function (38), and the necessary 
conditions equations(28)-(37) of the min-max solutions for the the first 
follower player outside the coalition with control 1v  yields the following:  
 
1
* 1 1 11 1








− + − +
∂
 
 * 1 11 1 1 3
1
= 1 = 0H v
u
η η∂ − + − +
∂
 




η η∂ − +
∂
 
 * 1 2 2 22 2 2 2 5 7
2
= 2( ) = 0H v u q
v
ς ς∂ − + − +
∂
 
 * 1 *( , , , , ) = 0, = 1,2., = 0,1, ,7.ji i oh t x u u v j iς   
 0, = 1,2., = 0,1, ,7.ji j iς ≥   
 1 * 1 *( , , , , ) = 0, = 0,1, ,7.i i oh t x u u v iη   
 1 0, = 0,1, ,7.i iη ≤                   (75) 
 solving the equations(75); it follows that the min-max solution for the 





v u , 
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1 1
2 1< 4u u−  and 
* * 1
2 2 2= ( )v v u  given by (72). Similarly for player with controls 
2v , equation(38), and the necessary conditions equations(28)-(37) gives  
 * 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 5 7
2
= 2( ) = 0H v u q
v
ς ς∂ − + − +
∂
 




η η∂ − +
∂
 
 * 2 2 22 2 2 2 3
2
= 2( ) 1 = 0H v u
u
η η∂ − − + − +
∂
 
    
1
* 2 1 11 1








− + − +
∂
 
    * 2 *( , , , , ) = 0, = 1,2., = 0,1, ,7.ji i oh t x u u v j iς   
         0, = 1,2., = 0,1, ,7.ji j iς ≥   
    2 * 2 *( , , , , ) = 0, = 0,1, ,7.i i oh t x u u v iη   
          2 0, = 0,1, ,7.i iη ≤         (76) 
 where = 0,2, ,7.i  , solving the equations (76); it follows that the min-max 





v v  and 
2 2
1 2= 0, = 4u u . 
Finally the leader based on the optimality concept of the followers announce 
his control 0u  that minimize his cost, the corresponding hamiltonian function 
for the leader is given by (64) 
2 1 2
0 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 0 1 0 0 2
1( , , , , , ) = [( 1) ] ( ) ( )
2
H t x u u v p u u u v v p v p u v− + − − + + + +  
 1 1 0 1 3ˆ ˆ[2 2 4 2 ]u wu wλ δ δ+ + − − − +  
 2 2 0 2 3ˆ ˆ[(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ]w u w u wλ δ δ+ + − − − + − +  
 1 1 1 2 2 21 1 1 1 4 6 2 2 2 2 5 7ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ / 2 ] [2( ) ]v u q v u qλ δ δ λ δ δ+ − + − + + − + − +  
 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 1 2 4 1 5 2(4 )u u u u u v vµ µ µ µ µ µ− − − − − − − −  
 6 1 7 2
2(1 ) ( )
3
v vµ µ− − − −   
The necessary conditions for stakelberg solution with pareto, nash min-max 
followers (39)-(63), gives  
 1 00
1
















































 * *1 0 1 3
1
ˆ ˆ= 2 2 4 2 = 0H u wu w
u
δ δ∂ + − − − +
∂
 
 *2 0 2 3
2
ˆ ˆ= (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) = 0H w u w u w
u





* * 1 11 1
1 1 4 6
1






− + − +
∂
 
 * * 2 2 22 2 2 2 5 7
2
ˆ ˆ= 2( ) = 0H v u q
v
δ δ∂ − + − +
∂
 
 * 20 0 0 1 2 0
0




− + + − − −
∂
 
 0 1 1 1 3
1
= 1 2 = 0H
u
λ λ µ µ
∂
+ − − +
∂
 
 0 2 2 2 3
2
= 1 (1 ) 2 = 0H w
u
λ λ µ µ
∂
− + + − − +
∂
 
 0 1 4 6
1




− + − +
∂
 
 0 2 5 7
2







 ˆ = 0 = 0,1, ,7.i ih iδ   
 ˆ = 0 = 1,2 = 0,1, ,7.ji ih j iδ   
 = 0 = 0,1, ,7.i ih iµ   
 ˆ 0 = 0,1, ,7.i iδ ≥   
 ˆ 0 = 1,2 = 0,1, ,7.ji j iδ ≥   
 0 = 0,1, ,7.i iµ ≥                     (78) 
          Solving these system of equations (78) it yields that the stakelberg 
solution with pareto, nash min-max followers game is  
* * * * *
0 1 2 1 2
2 2( , , , , ) = (1,1 , ,1, )
1 3








 This study tends to introduce a new approach to stackelberg dynamic 
game with various optimality response between the followers.  
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